Date:	Thu, 26 Mar 1998 19:26:37 -0600
From:	Steven Pritchard <steve@SILUG.ORG>
Subject:      Re: Majordomo /tmp exploit
To:	BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG

Karl G - NOC Admin said:
> -=x-ploit=-
> create a symlink in /tmp to any majordomo file
> ex: ln -s /usr/lib/majordomo/majordomo /tmp/majordomo.debug

Looking at the latest version of majordomo (1.94.4), it seems the
problem isn't that bad.  A well-configured majordomo is not
vulnerable.  (By "well-configured", I mean where the admin has edited
majordomo.cf to change $TMPDIR to something not world-writable.  If
you haven't done that yet, do it now.)

I did find one case where majordomo doesn't honor the $TMPFILE
variable though.  Apply the following patch to fix it:

-- Cut here --

--- majordomo.pl.orig   Wed Aug 27 09:58:53 1997
+++ majordomo.pl        Thu Mar 26 18:42:29 1998
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@
 }

 # These are package globals referenced by &setlogfile and &log
-$log_file = "/tmp/log.$$";
+$log_file = "$main'TMPDIR/log.$$";
 $log_host = "UNKNOWN";
 $log_program = "UNKNOWN";
 $log_session = "UNKNOWN";

-- end --

Enjoy.

Steve
--
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